A New Research into Default Logic  by Mingyi, Zhang
File: 643J 258901 . By:CV . Date:25:10:96 . Time:08:27 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 7367 Signs: 4974 . Length: 60 pic 11 pts, 257 mm
Information and Computation  IC2589
information and computation 129, 7385 (1996)
A New Research into Default Logic*
Zhang Mingyi-
Guizhou Academy of Sciences, 40 East Yanan Road, Guiyang, Guizhou 550001, People’s Republic of China; and
Southwest Normal University, Beibei, Chongqing, Sichuan 630715, People’s Republic of China
In previous papers some important properties of extensions of
general default theories were given. In order to dedicate further research
to default logic, a characterization of extensions is presented again and
some new algorithms for reasoning tasks in default logic are presented
in this paper. A class of default theories, auto-compatible default
theory, is also developed. We show that the characterization and
notions of compatibility and auto-compatibility, suitably applied to
logic programs, yield some sufficient conditions of existence of answer
sets. All these essentially develop the theories of Reiter and his
followers. ] 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Reiter’s default logic [2] is a formalism for non-
monotonic inference, which provides a formal framework
for an important part of human reasoning and appears to be
the most stable of the approaches to non-monotonic
inference [4]. However, the general class of default theories
is mathematically intractable [5]. Reiter and his followers
have place heavy emphasis on the class of the so-called nor-
mal default theories [3]. Although most of the commonly
occurring default rules are normal, when viewed in isola-
tion, they can interact with each other in ways that lead
to counterintuitive results. In order to deal with such
anomalies, Reiter and Criscuolo [3] introduced semi-
normal defaults. Unfortunately, these lack many fine
properties (e.g., existence of extensions, semi-monotonicity,
and a reasonably clean proof theory) enjoyed by normal
default theories. In addition, most of the formal properties
of general default theories remain unexplored.
Following a different approach from that of [2], the
problem of the existence of extensions for general theories
was studied and a characterization of extensions was given
[1], [19], [20]. First, to make this paper self contained
and to emphasize the importance of the characterization we
represent the characterization in a way, slightly different
from that in [1] and prove it in a simple and easy way.
At the same time, some new results and algorithms for
reasoning tasks in default logic are given. Second, a class of
default theories, named auto-compatible default theory, is
developed. In a sense, this answers the problem of how to
block certain unwanted derivations and to conserve the nine
properties which make normal default theories so appeal-
ing. We also prove that auto-compatibility is equivalent to
semi-monotonicity for the class of prerequisite-free default
theories. Third, we apply th notions of compatibility and
auto-compatibility for general default theories to extended
logic programs and obtain sufficient conditions for the exist-
ence of answer sets, which are different from the other
known sufficient conditions, e.g., Apt’s stratification [16]
and Kunen’s signing [17].
According to [1, 2] some notions and properties used
through this paper are as follows.
Let LA be the set of first order wffs over an alphabet A
consisting of countably many variables, function letters, and
predicate letters, the usual punctuation signs, and the
standard logical constants and quantifiers. We will
generally write L instead of LA for the first order language.
As usual, a wff is said to be closed iff it contains no free
variables. For any set S of closed wffs and any closed wff
|, S |&| means that | is the first order provable from
premises S. For any set of closed wffs SL, define
ThL(S)=[| | | # L, | is closed, and S |&|]. (Usually,
write Th instead of ThL .) We call any expression of the form
:(x) : M;1(x), ..., M;n(x)#(x) (1.1)
a default, where :(x), ;1(x), ..., ;n(x), #(x) are wffs, whose
free variables are among those of x=x1 , ..., xm . :(x) is
called the prerequisite of the default, and #(x) is called its
consequent. M;1(x), ..., M;n(x) are called consistency con-
ditions, which indicate that each of ;1(x), ..., ;n(x) is consis-
tent with all of the beliefs. A default is closed iff none of
:, ;1 , ..., ;n , # contains a free variable. Call a pair (D, W ) a
default theory, where D is a set of defaults and W is a set of
closed wffs. A default theory (D, W) is closed iff every
default of D is closed.
Definition 1 [2]. Let 2=(D, W) be a closed default
theory such that every default of D has the form
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(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #), where :, ;1 , ..., ;n , # are all closed wffs
of L. For any set of closed wffs SL, let 1(S) be the smallet
set satisfying the following three properties:
D1. W1(S).
D2. ThL(1(S))=1(S).
D3. If (: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D, : # 1(S), and c;1 , ...,
c;n  S, then # # 1(S).
A set of closed wffs EL is an extension for 2 iff
1(E)=E, i.e., iff E is a fixed point of the operator 1.
As in [2], the technical results about closed default
theories can be generalized to the case of open defaults by
Skolemizing W as well as all of defaults. So we restrict our-
selves to closed default theories through this paper.
Notation [1]. For any default subset D$ of D, we write
PRE(D$)=[:|(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D$]
CCS(D$)=[;i | ;i # [;1 , ..., ;n]
where(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D$]
CON(D$)=[# | (: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D$].
Definition 2 [1]. Let 2=(D, W ) be a closed default
theory. For any set of closed wffs EL, define
E0(2)=W, for i0
Ei+1(2)=ThL(Ei (2)) _ [# | (: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D
where : # Ei (2) and c;1 , ..., c;n  E ].
Let 3(E, 2)=0i< Ei (2) and
GD(3(E, 2), 2)=[(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D | : # 3(E, 2),
c;1 , ..., ;n  E ].
In particular, the definition GD(3(E, 2), 2) is equivalent
to that of GD(E, 2) in [2] when 3(E, 2)=E; i.e., if E is an
extension of 2, then
GD(E, 2)=[(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D | : # E,
c;1 , ..., ;n  E ].
Definition 3 [1]. Given a closed default theory
2=(D, W ) and any subset D$ of D, define
D$0(2)=[(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D$ | W |&:] for i0
D$i+1(2)=[(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D$ | W
_CON(D$i (2)) |&:]
4(D$, 2)= .
0i<
D$i (2).
A default (:; M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D&4(D, 2) is called use-
less. Generally, we will write 4(D$) instead of 4(D$, 2).
Definition 4 [1]. For any closed default theory
2=(D, W ) and any set D$D, if there exists
(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D$ such that W _ CON(D$) |&c;i
for some i, 1in, then D$ is called incompatible with
respect to 2. If D$ is not incompatible, then it is compatible.
Definition 5 [1]. Given a closed default theory
2=(D, W ), a subset of defaults D$D is called maximally
compatible w.r.t. 2 iff D$ is compatible and D" is not com-
patible for any D", D$/D"D. (Here, D$/D" means that
D$D" and D${D".)
Definition 6 [1]. Given a closed default theory
2=(D, W ), a default $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D is said to
be auto-incompatible w.r.t. 2, if there is a compatible default
subset D$ of D such that for all i, 1in, W _ CON(D$) |&%
c;i and such that, for some ;$ # CCS(D$ _ [$]), W _
CON(D$ _ [$]) |&c;$.
The following theorems are easily proved by Definitions 1
and 2. They show that Definitions 1 is well formed and
Reiter’s characterization of extensions can be restated by the
operator 3.
Theorem 1.1 [1]. Let 2=(D, W) be a closed default
theory. For any set of closed wffs EL, 3(E, 2)=1(E), i.e.
the operator 1 is well-defined in the class of sets [E | EL
and E is a set of closed wffs].
Theorem 1.2 [1]. (i.e. Theorem 2.1 of [2]) A set E of
closed wffs is an extension for a closed default theory
2=(D, W ) iff E=3(E, 2).
From Definitions 2 and 4 we get the following result
immediately.
Theorem 1.3 [1]. If a closed default theory 2=(D, W )
has an extension E then GD(E, 2) is compatible.
2. CHARACTERIZATION AND ALGORITHMS
Reiter gave a characterization of extensions in terms of a
sequence of sets of closed wffs (Theorem 2.1 [2]). By this
characterization we can determine if a set E of closed wffs is
an extension of a closed default theory. However, it is
neccessary to test an enormous collection of sets. So this
obstructs further investigation of the general class of
defaults. As in [1], we start immediately from a default
theory to explore the problem of the existence of extensions,
and give a simpler and natural characterization of exten-
sions, which depends only on the given information W and
the set D of defaults. Then we propose algorithms for
various reasoning tasks in default logic.
74 ZHANG MINGYI
File: 643J 258903 . By:CV . Date:25:10:96 . Time:08:27 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 5867 Signs: 4054 . Length: 56 pic 0 pts, 236 mm
2.1. A Characterization of Extensions
In this subsection we present and prove some basic results
taken from our earlier work (a technical report of 1991 and
a paper of 1992) [1], [19] in order to attein a deep under-
standing of the subject. The only difference is that proofs of
these results in the present paper are simpler and easier than
those in [1].
At first, to characterize extensions of general theories only
in terms of their generating defaults, we derive some proper-
ties of the set GD(E, 2) of generating defaults: GD(E, 2) is
a fixed point of the operator 4 and is compatible. Then we
give a new characterization of extensions.
Lemma 2.1. Let E be an extension of a default theory
2=(D, W ); then
4(GD(E, 2), 2)=GD(E, 2).
Proof. From Definitions 2 and 3 we have 4(GD(E, D), 2)
=0i (GD(E, 2)) i and GD(E, 2)=0i GD(Ei , 2),
where GD(Ei , 2)=[(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #)#D | : # Ei&1 ,
c;1 , ..., c;n  E ] (i>0) and GD(E0 , 2)=<. It is easy to
see that 4(GD(E, 2), 2)GD(E, 2) by Definition 3.
Now we prove by induction that GD(Ei , 2)
GD(E, 2)i&1 for all i>0
Base. It is clear that GD(E1 , 2)(GD(E, 2))0 .
Step. Assume that GD(Ei , 2)(GD(E, 2)) i&1. For
any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # GD(Ei+1 , 2), we have : # Ei
and c;1 , ..., ;n  E. So : # Th(Ei&1 _ CON(GD(Ei , 2)).
Therefore W _ CON(GD(Ei , 2)) |&:. By induction assump-
tion, we have W _ CON((GD(E, 2))i&1 |&:, which yields
$ # (GD(E, 2)) i .
The result implies that GD(E, 2)4(GD(E, 2), 2). This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 2.2. Any closed default theory 2=(D, W) has
an extension iff there exists a compatible subset D* of
defaults such that
P1. 4(D*)=D*D.
P2. For any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D&D*, either
W _ CON(D*) |&% : or W _ CON(D*) |&c;i for some i,
1in.
Proof. The case where W is inconsistent is not con-
sidered, as it makes the theorem trivial. In fact, 2 has an
inconsistent extension iff W is inconsistent by Corollary 2.2
of [2]. At the same time, D* in the theorem is just empty.
Only If. If 2 has a consistent extension E, then
GD(E, 2) is compatible by Theorem 1.3. So GD(E, 2)
satisfies P1 by Lemma 2.1. Next, if there is $=(: : M;1 , ...,
M;n #) # D&GD(E, 2) such that W _ CON(GD(E, 2))|&:
and W _ CON(GD(E, 2)) |&% c;1 , ..., ;m then : # E,
c;1 , ..., ;m  E. Hence $ # GD(E, 2), a contradiction. That
is, GD(E, 2) satisfies P2.
If. Assume that D* is a compatible subset of defaults
satisfying P1 and P2. Let E=Th(W _ CON(D*)). First we
show by induction on i that 3(E, 2)E.
Base. Obviously, E0E.
Step. Assume that EiE. Then Th(Ei)E and
: # E, c;1 , ..., ;n  E for any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) #
GD(Ei+1 , 2) since Ei+1=Th(Ei) _ CON(GD(Ei+1 , 2)).
So $ # D* (otherwise it would contradict P2). This implies
Ei+1E.
Next we show that E3(E, 2). To prove this
it is sufficient to show that D*GD(3(E, 2), 2)
since E=Th(W _ CON(D*)) and 3(E, 2)=Th(W _
CON(GD(3(E, 2), 2))). Now we show by induction on i
that (D*) iGD(E2i+2 , 2).
Base. For any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # (D*)0 , then
W _ CON(D*) |&% c;1 , ..., c;n in view of the compatibility
of D*. And : # E1 since W |&:. So : # E2 .
Step. Assume (D*) iGD(E2i+2 , 2). Then for any $=
(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # (D*) i+1, we have W _ CON((D*) i)
|&:. By the induction assumption, we get W _
CON(GD(E2i+2 , 2)) |&:. So : # E2i+3. Hence W _
CON(D*) |&% c;1 , ..., ;n by the compatibility of D*. This
gives $ # GD(E2i+4 , 2), which yields (D*) i+1
GD(E2i+4 , 2).
The result implies that D*GD(3(E, 2), 2) since
D*=4(D*)=0i (D*) i . Therefore E3(E, 2). So,
E=3(E, 2) and E is an extension of 2 by Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 2.3. Any closed default theory has exactly one
extension iff there is a unique compatible subset of defaults
satisfying P1 and P2 in Theorem 2.2.
Proof. This is easy by Theorem 2.2.
In what follows we show some results for the operator 4
and give an equivalent form of Theorem 2.2, from which
new algorithms for default reasoning will be derived.
Lemma 2.4. Given a closed default theory 2=(D, W )
and subsets D$, D"D, if D$D" then 4(D$)4(D"). As a
result, 4(4(D$))=4(D$) for any D$D.
Proof. The first part of the lemma is easily obtained by
induction. For the second part, it is quite obvious that
4(4(D$))4(D$) by Definition 3. Now we prove by induc-
tion on i that (D$)i((4(D$)) i .
Base. It is clear that (D$)0(4(D$))0 .
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Step. Assume (D$) i(4(D$)) i . Then $ # 4(D$) and
W _ CON((D$)i) |&: for any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) #
(D$)i+1. By the induction assumption, W _ CON((4(D$))i
|&:, which implies that $ # 4(D$))i+1. So (D$)i+1
(4(D$))i+1.
All of the above shows that 4(4(D$))=4(D$).
The following consequence comes immediately from
Lemma 2.4 and Definition 4.
Corollary 2.5. Let D$ be a compatible subset of
defaults with respect to 2=(D, W ). Then 4(4(D$))=4(D$)
and 4(D$) is also compatible.
Lemma 2.6. Let (D, W ) be any default theory. For
any D$D, if 4(D$)=D$ then 4(D$ _ [$])=D$ _ [$] iff
W _ CON(D$) |&PRE([$]) for any $ # D.
Proof. If. Obvious. In fact, there is some i0 such
that W _ CON((D$) i) |&PRE([$]) since 4(D$)=D$. This
means $ # (D$) i+1.
Only If. If W |&PRE([$]), then W _ CON(D$) |&
PRE([$]). If W |&PRE([$]) does not hold, then there is
some i0 such that W _ CON((D$ _ [$]) i) |&PRE([$])
does not hold and such that W _ CON((D$ _ [$]) i+1) |&
PRE[$]. It is easy to see that (D$ _ [$]) i+1D$. So
W _ CON(D$) |&PRE([$]).
The following example shows that the condition
4(D$)=D$ is important for the above lemma.
Example 2.1. Let W=<, D=[ : AB, C : DE,
B : FC ], D$=[ : AB, C : DE ]. Clearly, 4(D$)=
[ : AB]/D$ and 4(D$ _ [B : FC])=D{4(D$) _
[B : FC].
It is worthwhile to note that a successive approximation
method solving the fixed equation 4(D)=D can be
obtained by applying Lemma 2.6.
Lemma 2.7. If a closed default theory 2=(D, W ) has an
extension E, then there is a maximally compatible subset of
D* of defaults with respect to 2 such that GD(E, 2)=
4(D*).
Proof. The case where E is inconsistent is not con-
sidered, as it makes the lemma trivial. By Theorem 1.3 and
Lemma 2.1 we know that GD(E, 2) is compatible and
GD(E, 2)=4(GD(E, 2)). So there is a maximally com-
patible subset D* of defaults such that GD(E, 2)D*. By
Lemma 2.4, GD(E, 2)4(D*). Now we show by induction
on i that (D*) i(GD(E, 2)) i , which implies that 4(D*)
4(GD(E, 2))=GD(E, 2) and that 4(D*)=GD(E, 2).
Base. Clearly, (D*)0(GD(E, 2))0 .
Step. Assume (D*) i(GD(E, 2)) i , then W _
CON((D*) i |&: for any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # (D*) i+1.
By the induction assumption, W _ CON((GD(E, 2) i) |&:.
Since c;1 , ..., ;n  E by the compatibility of D*, it fol-
lows that $ # (GD(E, 2)) i+1. Therefore (D*) i+1
(GD(E, 2)) i+1.
The following theorem gives an equivalent form of
Theorem 2.2 and the proof is simply consists of an applica-
tion of Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 2.7.
Theorem 2.8. Any closed default theory 2=(D, W ) has
an extension iff there is a maximally compatible subset D* of
defaults with respect to 2 such that for any $=(: : M;1 , ...,
M;n #) # D&D*, either W _ CON(4(D*)) |&% : or W _
CON(4(D*)) |&c;i for some i, 1in.
Now we derive two sufficient conditions of existence of
extension from the characterization of extensions.
Theorem 2.9 [1]. Let 2=(D, W) be a closed default
theory. If D is compatible then 2 has exactly one extension.
Proof. It is easy to verify that 4(D) is a unique set
satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2.2 by Lemmas 2.4, 2.6
and Corollary 2.5.
Theorem 2.10 [1]. Let 2=(D, W ) be a closed default
theory. If 2 does not contain any auto-incompatible default
then it has an extension.
Proof. Let
CMD=[D*D | D* is compatible w.r.t. 2]
LCMD=[4(D*) | D* # CMD].
Clearly, LCMD is not empty. Assume that [Bi | i0] is
a chain of LCMD under the set operator  and let
B*=i0 Bi . By Lemma 2.4 we have Bi=4(Bi , 2)
4(B*, 2) for any i0, which implies that B*=4(B*, 2).
If B* is incompatible, then there exists a default
$=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # B* such that W _ CON(B*)
|&c;i for some i, 1in. By compactness of the first
order logic, there are B1 , ..., Bj such that W _
CON(B1 _ } } } _ Bj) |&c;i . Suppose that $ # Bk and
m=max[ j, k]. Notice that [Bi | i0] is a chain. So
W _ CON(Bm) |&c;i . This is a contradiction to com-
patibility of Bm . Hence, B* is compatible and B* # LCMD.
For any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D&4(B*), i.e., $ #
D&B*, there are two cases to be considered.
Case 1. W _ CON(4(B*)) |&% :. Obviously B* satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 2.2.
Case 2. W _ CON(4(B*)) |&:. LetB**=B* _ [$].
By Lemma 2.6 we have B**=4(B**, 2). If B** is com-
patible then B*=B**, a contradiction. So B** is incom-
patible, i.e., W _ CON(B**) |&c; for some ; # CCS(B**).
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If W _ CON(B*) |&% c;i for each i, 1in, then $ is auto-
incompatible, a contradiction. Hence W _ CON(4(B*))
|&c;i for some i, 1in. This shows that the conditions
of Theorem 2.2 are also satisfied.
By Theorem 2.2 2 has an extension E=Th(W _
CON(B*)).
Finally we show that Proposition 6.2.23 in [4] is simply
a corollary of Theorem 2.9.
Corollary 2.11 [4]. A closed default theory 2=
(D, W ) has exactly one extension if [;17 } } } 7;n 7 # | $=
(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D] is consistent with respect to 2.
Proof. It is sufficient to notice that the consistency
of W _ [;1 7 } } } 7 ;n 7 # | $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D]
implies the compatibility of D. So the corollary is true by
Theorem 2.9.
Generally, there are examples satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 2.9 but not satisfying the condition of Corol-
lary 2.11, e.g., 2=([ : AB, : cAC], <] has a unique
extension E=Th(B 7 C) since [ : AB, : cAC] is com-
patible, but W _ [A 7 B, cA 7 C] is inconsistent. It is
worth mentioning that Theorem 3 of [8] is simply a special
case of Proposition 6.2.23 of [4] (it is also Corollary 2.11
here). And other theorems of [8] are only some trivial facts.
So our results are more general than those of [4], [8].
2.2. Algorithms
Now we deal with the following problem: from the
characterization (i.e., Theorem 2.8) given in the previous
subsection derive new algorithms for various reasoning
tasks in default logic. A process of finding an extension,
given in our earlier work [1], [19], we will now be restated
as follows.
Clearly, Theorem 2.8 provides for a simpler and more
helpful scheme for constructing extensions of a closed
default theory than Theorem 1.2 does because it does not
depend on any set E of closed wffs, unlike the situation in
Theorem 1.2. Assume that we can decide whether
W _ CON(D$) |&:, c; holds for a given closed default
theory 2=(D, W) and for any :, ; # PRE(D$) _ CCS(D$),
where D$D. To determine if 2 has an extension we need
only test every maximally compatible subset of defaults with
respect to 2. In other words, for a given maximally com-
patible subset D*, if there exists $=(: : M;1 , ...,
M;n #) # D&D* such that W _ CON(4(D*)) |&: and
W _ CON(4(D*)) |&% c;1 , ..., c;n , then reject the D* and
continue to test another maximally compatible subset of
defaults. This testing will proceed until one of the following
cases occurs:
Case 1. If all maximally compatible subsets of defaults
are rejected, then 2 has not extension.
Case 2. If some maximally compatible subset D* of
defaults is not rejected, then E=Th(W _ CON(4(D*))) is
one extension of 2.
More specifically, let 2=(D, W ) be a finite propositional
default theory; i.e., D and W both are finite sets. For con-
venience we suppose that each element of D is a default with
single justification. Now we introduce the following func-
tions in similar to [10].
FUNCTION LAMBDA(D, W, D$)
BEGIN
result :=<
REPEAT new :=<;
FOR EACH d=A : BC # D$&result DO
IF W _ CON(result) |&A THEN new :=new _ [d ];
result :=result _ new
UNTIL new=<
RETURN (result)
END
The correctness of LAMBDA is immediate from Defini-
tion 3. Notice that the procedure LAMBDA uses at most
|D$| 2 logical implication tests ( |&) and outside these tests
has runtime O(n2) where n is the size of the input.
In order to deal with reasoning tasks in default logic we
introduce the following concept.
Definition 7. Given a closed default theory 2=
(D, W ), a compatible subset D$ of D is called an SC set
of defaults if 4(D$)=D$ and there is not any default
$=(: : ;1 , ..., ;n#) # D&D$ such that W _ CON(D$) |&:
and W _ CON(D$) |&% c;i for all 1in:
BOOLEAN FUNCTION SC(D, W, D$)
BEGIN
FOR EACH A : BC # D$ DO
IF W _ CON(D$) |&cB THEN RETURN (false)
IF LAMBDA(D, W, D$){D$ THEN RETURN (false);
FOR EACH A : BC # D&D$ DO
IF W _ CON(D$) |&A AND W _ CON(D$) |&% cB
THEN RETURN (false)
RETURN (true)
END
The correctness of SC follows directly from Definition 7.
This procedure invokes no more than ( |D$| )2+2 |D$|+
|D&D$| logical interference tests ( |&) and has quadratic
runtime modulo these tests.
Now we consider the membership problem: check
wthether a given closed formula A belongs to the extension
generated by an SC set D$D of defaults of (D, W). It can
be solved by the following Boolean function:
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BOOLEAN FUNCTION MEMBER(A, D, W, D$)
BEGIN
F : =W _ CON(D$);
IF F |&A THEN RETURN (true) ELSE
RETURN (false)
END
Its correctness is immediate from Theorem 2.2.
MEMBER has linear runtime in the input size expect for
time consumed within the inference test F |&A. So the total
runtime of MEMBER is linear in the input size.
With the functions SC and MEMBER as building blocks,
it is easy to design an algorithm for skeptical reasoning (SR)
in default logic. This algorithm checks whether a given
closed formula A is a skeptical consequence of a given
closed default theory (D, W), i.e., decides whether the
formula A occurs in all extensions of (D, W ).
BOOLEAN FUNCTION SR(A, D, W )
BEGIN
FOR EACH D$D DO
IF SC(D, W, D$) AND NOT MEMBER(A, C, W, D$)
THEN RETURN (false);
RETURN (true)
END
Its correctness is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.2.
Similarly, we can design an algorithm for credulous
reasoning, which checks whether a given closed formula A
is a credulous consequence of a given closed default theory
(D, W ), i.e., decides whether the formula A occurs in some
extension (D, W ):
BOOLEAN FUNCION CR(A, D, W )
BEGIN
FOR EACH D$D DO
IF SC(D, W, D$) AND MEMBER(A, D, W, D$)
THEN RETURN (true)
RETURN (false)
END
It is worthwhile to notice that by applying the new algo-
rithms here we can get the same results on the complexity
for propositional default logic as in [11, 12, 13]: deciding
whether a default theory has an extension is 7 p2 -complete,
skeptical reasoning is 6 p2 -complete, and credulous reason-
ing is 7 p2 -complete.
3. AUTO-COMPATIBLE DEFAULT THEORY
Unlike normal default theories, general default theories are
very complicated. Most of their formal properties are almost
unexplored. At the very least an appropriate proof theory is
needed, as well as conditions, under which extensions are
guaranteed to exit, should be explored. In Section 2 we gave
some sufficient conditions for existence of extensions. Based
on these we will now further develop a class of default
theories, so-called auto-compatible default theories, which
contains normal default theories as its proper subclass and
maintains very nice features enjoyed by the latter, such as
semi-monotonicity and a reasonable proof theory. In par-
ticular, we find that auto-compatibility is an essential
character of the class of prerequisite-free default theories
enjoying semi-monotonicity.
Definition 8. Given a closed default theorey 2=
(D, W ), a default $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D is said to be
auto-compatible w.r.t. 2 if it is not auto-incompatible w.r.t
2, i.e., for any compatible default subset D$ of D, D$ _ [$]
is consistent or it holds that W _ CON(D$) |&c;i for
some i, 1in.
Definition 9. A closed default theory 2=(D, W) is
auto-compatible iff every default of D is auto-compatible
w.r.t. 2.
Corollary 3.1. For any default theory 2=(D, W), if
D is compatible w.r.t. 2 then 2 is auto-compatible.
Corollary 3.2. Any normal default theory is auto-
compatible.
We illuminate the notion of auto-compatibility by follow-
ing examples.
Example 3.1. Consider a default theory 2=(D, W),
where W=< and D=[ : pq, : cpq, : cq 6cr 6 css].
Clearly D is compatible w.r.t. 2 and therefore 2 is auto-
compatible. Now let W$=[r]; then (D, W$) is not auto-
compatible, since: cq 6 cr 6csq is auto-incompatible
w.r.t. (D, W$). It is easy to see that (D, W$) has no extension.
Example 3.2. The default theory 2=([ : pp,
: cpcp], <) with the incompatible set [ : pp, : cpcp]
of defaults is auto-compatible.
Example 3.3. Clearly 2=([s: pp, r : c(q7p)q], [s])
is not auto-compatible, since s: pp is auto-incompatible
w.r.t. 2. But it has a unique extension Th([s, p]).
This final example shows that auto-compatibility is
sufficient but not necessary for existence of extensions.
Corollary 3.3. Given an auto-compatible theory
2=(D, W ) and D$/D, then 2$=(D$, W) is also auto-
compatible.
Corollary 3.4. For a semi-normal default theory
2=(D, W ) [4], if W _ CCS(D) is consistent then D is
compatible.
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Proof. Assume on the contrary that D is incompatible,
i.e., there exists a default $=: : ; 7 ## # D such that
W _ CON(D) |&c; 6 c#. Since # # CON(D) and
CCS(D) |&CON(D), W _ CCS(D) |&c;. So W _ CCS(D)
is inconsistent, a contradiction.
We use the following example to illustrate the above
results.
Example 3.4. Let 2=([ : p 7cqp, : q7 rq], <).
Clearly, 2 is not auto-compatible and D is incompatible,
since [ p, q, p 7 cq] is inconsitent.
Example 3.5. Let 2=([ : p 7 qp], [cp 6 cq]). It is
easy to see that 2 is auto-compatible although [cp 6cq,
p, q] is inconsistent.
Remark. Reiter and Criscuolo gave several example to
show that there are semi-normal default theories, which
have no extension [3]. In those examples every default is
aut-incompatible w.r.t. corresponding default theory. They
also gave an example [3] to illustrate that there are semi-
normal default theories which do not satisfy monotonicity.
In that example the added default: M cAcA is also auto-
incompatible. In order to block the so-called transitivity,
14 representations of default rules were introduced in
Figures 2.1 and 2.4 of [3]. Let D be any representation of
them and let W=< ; then D is compatible w.r.t. (D, W ) or
(D, W ) is an auto-compatible default theory. Hence, the
class of auto-compatible defaults seems to be a tool for
blocking certain unwarranted derivations.
Reiter and Criscuolo [3] pointed out that most of the
formal properties of semi-normal default theories remain
unexplored and that two problems in particular require
solutions: how to guarantee the existence of extensions and
how to develop an appropriate proof theory. The class of
auto-compatible default theories suggests some possibility
of finding a subclass of semi-normal default theories which
solves the above problems. For example, the class
[(D, W ) | D is semi-normal and W _ CCS(D) is consistent]
is auto-compatible by Corollary 3.1 and 3.4. As shown in
Example 3.3, it is a proper subclass of semi-normal default
theories.
In what follows we give some results which make it
possible for us to deal with problems on the existence of
extensions and a proof theory.
Theorem 3.5 [1] (i.e., Theorem 2.10). Any auto-
compatible closed default theory has an extension.
In a way similar to the proof of Theorem 2.10 in [2], the
following results are easily obtained.
Lemma 3.6. Let E be an extension of an auto-compatible
theory 2=(D, W ). Then at least one of the following asser-
tions hold:
(1) GD(E, 2) is a maximally compatible subset of
defaults with respect to 2;
(2) for any D$D, if D$ is maximally compatible w.r.t. 2
and contains GD(E, 2) the E is also the extension of (D$, W).
Lemma 3.7. Let 2=(D, W ) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory. Assume that D$D and E$ is an exten-
sion for 2$=(D$, W). For any maximally compatible subset
D" of D, if GD(E$, 2$)D" and E$ is an extension for
(D", W ), then E$ is an extension for 2.
Theorem 3.8. Let 2=(D, W) be an auto-compatible
default theory, let D$D, and let E$ be an extension for
2$=(D$, W ). Then E$ is an extension for 2 iff for any maxi-
mally compatible subset D" of D with respect to 2, if
GD(E$, 2$)D", the E$ is also an extension for (D", W ).
Now we can propose a test condition for extensions of
auto-compatible default theories and the semi-monoto-
nicity theorem from the above mentioned theorem. The
proofs of these results are trivial.
Theorem 3.9. Let 2=(D, W) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory and E a set of closed wffs. E is an exten-
sion (consistent) for 2 iff GD(3(E, 2), 2) is compatible and
E is an extension for (D$, W ) where D$ is any maximally
compatible subset of defaults such that GD(3(E, 2), 2)D$.
Theorem 3.10 (Semi-monotonicity). Let 2=(D, W )
be an auto-compatible closed default theory. Assume that
D$D and E$ is an extension for 2$=(D$, W ). Then there is
an extension E for 2 such that E$E and GD(E$, 2$)
GD(E, 2).
The following properties come from Theorem 3.10:
P1. Updating an auto-compatible closed default theory
with new defaults cannot affect old belief provided the
resulted default theory is still auto-compatible.
P2. For auto-compatible closed default theories there is
a proof procedure which is local with respect to the defaults
so that proofs can be constructed, which ignore some of the
defaults.
Clearly, Theorem 3.2 in [2] is a corollary of Theorem 3.10
here.
We provide a proof theory for closed auto-compatible
default theories with a sufficient condition of auto-com-
patibility and a lemma similar to Lemma 4.1 of [2]. The
following lemma is obvious by definition of the com-
patibility.
Lemma 3.11. Let 2=(D, W) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory. Assume that D$ is any compatible
subset of defaults and that $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D. If
W _ CON(D$) _ CCS([$]) is consistent, then D$ _ [$] is
compatible with respect to 2.
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Lemma 3.12. Let 2=(D, W ) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory with $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n#) # D. If
W _ CON(D$) _ CCS([$]) is consistent, then (D, W _ [#])
is auto-compatible.
Proof. Obviously, W _ [#] is consistent, otherwise it
would follow that W |&% c;1 , ..., c;n and W _ [#] |&c;i
for some i (1in) by the consistency of W _ CON(D) _
CCS([$]). And this would mean that $ is auto-incom-
patible, a contradiction.
Now, assume that (D, W _ [#]) is not auto-compatible,
i.e., there exist a default $$=(:$ : M;$1 , ..., M;$m#$) # D and
a compatible subset D$ of defaults with respect to
(D, W _ [#]) such that W_[#]_CON(D$) |&% c;$1 , ..., c;$m
and W _ [#] _ CON((D$ _ [$$]) |&c; for some ; #
CCS(D$ _ [$$]). Clearly, D$ is compatible with respect to 2
and so is D$ _ [$] by Lemma 3.11 (this is due to consistency
of W _ CON(D) _ CCS([$$])). Hence $$ is auto-incom-
patible with respect to 2. And this yields a contradiction
since 2 is auto-compatible.
Lemma 3.13. Let 2=(D, W ) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory with $$=(:$ : M;$1 , ..., M;$n #$) # D.
Suppose that W |&:$ and that E is an extension for 2 such
that E _ CCS([$$]) is consistent, then E is also an extension
for (D, W _ [#$]). Conversely, if E$is an extension for
2$=(D, W _ [#$]) such that E$ _ CCS([$$]) is consistent
and such that W |&:$, then E$ is also an extension for 2.
Proof. Notice that $$ # GD(E, 2) and # # E since W |&:$
and E _ CCS([$$]) is consistent. By Theorem 2.6 of [2] E
also is an extension of 2$.
For the second part of this lemma we similarly get $$ #
GD(E$, 2$) and #$ # E$. So |&W _ CON(GD(E$, 2$)) W
W _ [#$] _ CON(GD(E$, 2$)). From this it is derived that
GD(E$, 2$) is compatible w.r.t. 2 and that GD(E$, 2$)
satisfies P2 in Theorem 2.2 (w.r.t. 2). An easy inductive
proof establishes that (GD(E$, 2$), 2$)n=(GD(E$, 2$), 2)n
for all n0, which implies that 4(GD(E$, 2$), 2$)=
4(GD(E$, 2$), 2). So E$=Th(W_[#$]_CON(GD(E$, 2$)))
=Th(W _ CON(GD(E$, 2$))). By Theorem 2.2 E$ also is an
extension of 2.
Corollary 3.14. Suppose 2=(D, W) is an auto-
compatible closed default theory with $$=(:$ : M;$1 , ...,
M;$n #$) # D. If W |&:$ and W _ CON([$$]) _ CCS([$$]) is
consistent, then (D, W _ [#$]) has an extension E and E is an
extension for 2 as well.
Proof. By consistency of W _ CON([$$]) _ CCS([$$]),
[$$] is compatible with respect to 2$=([$$], W). So 2$ has
a unique extension F and $$ # GD(F, 2$) by Theorem 2.9. It
comes from the Semi-monotonicity Theorem that 2 has an
extension E such that FE and $$ # GD(E, 2). Hence
E _ CCS([$$]) is consistent. Therefore it comes from
Lemma 3.13 that E is also one extension for (D, W _ [#$]).
Corollary 3.15. Let 2=(D, W ) be an auto-com-
patible closed default theory with D$D such that
W |&PRE(D$). If E is an extension for 2$=
(D, W _ CON(D$)) and E _ CCS(D) is consistent, then E is
also one extension for 2. In particular, this results in
Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 of [2] when 2 is a closed
normal default theory.
Proof. To prove the corollary, just repeatedly use
Corollary 3.14.
The following definition is similar to Definition 3.3 of [2].
Definition 10. Let 2=(D, W ) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory and b a closed wff. A finite sequence
D0 , ..., Dk of finite subsets of D is a default proof of b with
respect to 2 iff
P1. W _ CON(D0) |&b,
P2. for 1ik, W _ CON(Di) |&PRE(Di&1).
P3. Dk=<.
P4. W _ 0ik (CON(Di) _ CCS(Di)) is satisfiable.
The following result on the soundness and completeness
for default proofs and its proof is similar to those of [2].
Theorem 3.16. Let 2=(D, W ) be an auto-compatible
closed default theory and let b be a closed wff. 2 has an exten-
sion E such taht b # E iff b has a default proof with respect
to 2.
It is worth pointing out that auto-compatibility is impor-
tant to semi-monotonicity although it is a stronger sufficient
condition for the existence of extensions of non-normal
default theories. This is shown by Examples 9.2.13 and 9.3.5
in [4]. From these example we can see that neither ordered
semi-normal default theories nor taxonomic ones satisfy
semi-monotonicity as auto-compatible default theories do.
On the other hand, auto-compatibility is equivalent to semi-
monotonicity for the class of prerequisite-free default
theories (i.e., all defaults of a default theory are expressions
of the form M;1 , ..., M;n #). We give this property as
follows.
Theorem 3.17. Let 2=(D, W ) be a prerequisite-free
default theory. 2 is auto-compatible iff it enjoys semi-
monotonicity.
Proof. By Theorem 3.10 it is sufficient to show the part
IF. Suppose to the contrary that 2 is not auto-compatible,
i.e., there are a default $=: M;1 , ..., M;n # # D and a com-
patible set D$D w.r.t. 2 such that D$ _ [$] is incom-
patilbe w.r.t. 2 and W _ CON(D$) |&% ;i for each i : 1in.
By Theorem 2.9, (D$, W) has a unique extension E$=
Th(W _ CON(D$)). So (D$ _ [$], W) has an extension
E"$E$ by semi-monotonicity. This is a contradiction since
(D$ _ [$], W ) has no extension by auto-incompatibility of
$ and Theorem 2.2.
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4. APPLICATION
In this section we show that results in our paper are of
very wide application by capturing Sandewall’s functional
approach in our framework and by applying the results to
logic programs.
4.1. Sandewall ’s Functional Approach
We point out that our scheme given in the previous sub-
sections appears to be interesting when a correspondence
between maximally strong joint compatible subsets of
defaults of a default theory and a subset of maximally con-
sistent extensions of a valuation [7] is established. And it is
more convenient to generate extensions by our scheme than
that by Sandewall’s definition of a correct extension [7].
We start with a brief review of the relevant concepts of
Sandewall’s functional approach. He used the following
formal machinery: a domain L whose elements are called
formulas, and a domain J of four truth-values. The domain
L is called language with lb as the bottom element and lt as
the top element. The domain J contains the elements u (for
undefined), t (for true), f (for false), k (for contradiction),
with the partial order C= such that uC=t, f, k and t, fC=k.
Clearly J is a flat lattice with u as the bottom element and
k as the top element. A valuation is a function & from L into
J which satisfies v(lb)=u, &(lt)=k. This, in particular,
guarantees that valuations are continuous (and therefore
monotone). A valuation is consistent iff no formula other
than lt is mapped to k. Valuations form a lattice with the
partial order C= defined in the following way:
vC=v$ iff (\x) v(x)C=v$(x)
We say then that v$ is an extension of & and that v$ is
above & (w.r.t. C=).
A valuation & is finite iff v(l )=u except for a finite number
of formulas l.
Let V be the domain of valuations from L to J. A
deduction is a binary relation on V, i.e., a subset of V_V.
The operation _ and the relation  are therefore defined
on deductions. A deduction F is conservative iff F(v, v$) 
vC=v$ for any v, v$ # V, which can now be written as FC=.
A deduction F is linear iff F(v, y)  F(v ? z, y ? z), where
v ? z means the l.u.b. of & and z under C=. A derivation from
v to v$ using a conservative deduction F is a chain where
v=v0
F(vi , vi+1) for all i0
v$ is the l.u.b. of the chain.
A deduction F is compact iff whenever F(v, v$) there exists
some finite valuations y, y$ such that yC=v (which of course
means v=v ? y) and v$=v ? y$. A valuation & is maximally
consistant w.r.t. a deduction F iff F(v, v$)  v=v$ 6 [v$ is
consistent] for any v, v$ # V.
A kernel is a pair (v, v$) where v and v$ are finite valua-
tions and vC=v$. The direct realization of a kernel (v, v$) is
the deduction formed as [(v ? y, v$ ? y) | y # V ]. The
direct realization of a set of kernels is defined to be the union
(using _ ) of the direct realization of the individual kernels.
An NM-rule is a triple (M.N, C) of finite sets of
formulas, where M is the monotonic antecedents, N the
non-monotonic antecedents, and C the consequents. Each
of M, N, and C may be the empty set. If N is empty we have
a monotonic rule. If C is empty we have what Reiter calls
a normal default rule. The kernel that corresponds to an
NM-rule is the pair (v, v$) where
v(m)=v$(m)=t for all m in M
v$(n)=f for all n in N
v$(c)=t for all c in C.
and all other values are u.
The direct realization of an NM-rule is the direct realiza-
tion of its corresponding kernel.
The concepts and results of conventional logic can easily
be re-phrased along the following lines. A set of axioms is
seen as a valuation that maps some formulas (the axioms)
to t and all other formulas to u (an exception is made for
the top element lt). Derivation of theorems is done by
proceeding from the initial valuation to others where some
formulas change value from u to t or f. A set of inference
rules corresponds therefore to a binary relation on valua-
tions, i.e., a subset of V_V, which we shall call a deduction.
A derivation using a deduction F is a sequence of valua-
tions: v0 , v1 , ..., where (vi , vi+1) # F for each i0. The con-
ventions for calculating the truth-value of a propositional
expression may then be seen as a deduction F where F(v, v$),
e.g., in the case where v(a)=t, &(b)=t, &(a 7 b)=u,
&$(a 7 b)=t, and v$(z)=v(z) for all other formulas z. Here
a 7 b refers of course to the formula obtained by composing
the formula a, the conjunction operator, and the formula b.
Let H be that deduction which performs the obvious
deductions of conventional, propositional logic and H*(v)
the least fixpoint of H over v.
Sandewall’s functional view, staring with the lattice of
four truth-values (including k for contradiction), makes it
possible to deal with non-monotonic logic on a high level of
abstraction, avoiding tedious proofs. He demonstrated the
relevance of this approach by giving concise proofs for some
previously known results about normal default rules. For
non-monotonic rules in general (not only normal default
rules) he defined a stronger version of the minimality
requirement on consistent fixpoints and proved that it is
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sufficient for the existence of a derivation of the fix point.
So our results in the above sections seems to be adapted
and more convenient when further studding Sandewall’s
approach. In what follows we attempt to capture
Sandewall’s functional approach in our framework.
For any given default theory 2=(D, W), W is taken as
a valuation v that maps formulas (the members of W ) to t
and all other formulas to u. Any $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #)
is re-phrased as an NM-rule (PRE([$]), CCS([$]),
CON([$])) , where CCS(D$)=[c; | ; # CCS(D$)] for any
D$D. The direct realization of D is denoted as F. Suppose
MC(D)=[D$D | D$is maximally strong joint compatible]
MCF(v)=[v$ # V | v$ is a maximally consistent extension
of v w.r.t. F ].
Here the strong joint compatibility of D$ means W _
PRE(D$) _ CCS(D$) _ CON(D$) is consistent. And D$ is
maximally strong joint compatible if there is not any strong
joint compatible D"D such that D$/D". Clearly the
strong joint compatibility of D$ implies the compatibility
of D$.
Then a mapping g from MC(D) to MCF(v) is defined as
follows:
For any D$ # MC(D) let &$=g(D$) such that if D$=<
then v$=H*(v), and if D${< then v$=H*(v^), where
t for all l # PRE(D$) _ CON(D$) _ W
v^(l )={f for all l # CCS(D$)u for all other formulas.
The following lemma shows that the mapping g is well-
defined.
Lemma 4.1. For any D$ # MC(D), it holds that v$ #
MCF(v), where v$= g(D$).
Proof. Clearly, v$ is an extension of v and is consitent.
Now we show that v$ is a maximally consistent extension
of v w.r.t. F. If v$ is not maximal, then there is a consisten
extension v" of v such that v$C=v", v${v" and F(v$, v").
Obviously, using any deduction of conventional, proposi-
tional logic the derivation (v$, v") cannot be obtained,
since v$=H*(v), v$C=v" and v${v". Let $ # D be used to
obtain the derivation. Clearly $  D$. Since F is conservative
(cf. Proposition 6 of [7], i.e., the direction realization of a
set of kernels is conservative, linear and, compact), it is easy
to see that
v"(l )={ tf
for any l # PRE([$]) _ CON([$])
for any l # CCS([$]).
So, D$ _ [$] is compatible, a contradiction.
Similarly, the converse holds.
Lemma 4.2. There is a mapping h from MCF(v) to
MC(D) such that D$=h(&$) # MC(D) for any v$ # MCF(v).
Proof (outline). Use the same technique as that in the
previous proof, but let D$=[$ # D | $=(: : M;1 , ...,
M;n #), v$(:)=t, v$(c;1)= } } } =v$(c;n)= f, v$(#)=t].
The strong joint compatibility of D$ easily follows from the
above definition (possibly D$ is empty). If D$ is not maximal,
then there is $=(: : M;1 , ..., M;n #) # D&D$ such that
W _ PRE(D$ _ [$]) _ CCS(D$ _ [$]) _ CON(D$ _ [$])
is consistent. Define
v"(:)=v"(#)=t
v"(c;1)= } } } =v"(c;n)= f
v"(l )=v$(l ) for all other formulas.
Clearly, v" is consistent and (v$, v") # F, a contradiction.
Define an equivalence relation = on MCF(v) as follows:
v$=v" iff h(&$)=h(&").
Let MCF(v)= be the corresponding quotient set and
min[v$] the minimal members of [v$] (obviously, it is
unique), where [v$] # MCF(v)=. And let MLF(v)=
[H*(min[v$]) | v$ # MCF(v)]. Denote the restriction of h
on MLF(v) as h$.
Theorem 4.3. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between MC(D) and MLF(v).
Proof. It is easy to see that v$ # MLF(v) for any v$
defined in Lemma 4.1 and that g b h$ is an identity mapping.
So g is a desired one-to-one correspondence.
4.2. Application of Logic Programs
In this section we will apply our results to logic programs.
At same time, it will be shown that our approach is algo-
rithmically simpler in deciding whether an extended logic
program has an answer set.
Following Gelfond and Lifschitz [14], an extended logic
program (ELP) is a set of rules of the form
L0  L1 , ..., Lm , notLm+1 , ..., notLn , (4.1)
where nm0, and each Li (1in) is a literal; if m=n,
we write L0  L1 , ..., Lm and call it not containing not (in
particular, we write L0  true or just L0 , when m=n=0);
if m=0, we write L0  notL1 , ..., notLn . The semantics of
extende logic programs, when treating a rule with variable
as shorthand for the set of its ground instances, is given in
terms of answer sets. So, it is sufficient to define answer sets
for ELP without variables.
Definition 11 [14]. Let 6 be an ELP without
variables that, in addition, don’t contain not (m=n) in
every rule (4.1) of 6, and let Lit be the set of ground literals
in the language of 6. The answer set of 6 is the smallest sub-
set S of Lit such that
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(i) for any L0  L1 , ..., Lm from 6, if m=0 or
L1 , ..., Lm # S with m1 then L0 # S;
(ii) if S contain a pair of complementary literals, then
S=Lit.
Remark 4.1. The case m=0 of condition (i) is implicitly
assumed in [14].
We will denote the answer set of an ELP 6 that doesn’t
contain not by !(6).
Definition 12 [14]. Let 6 be an ELP without
variables. For any set SLit, we define 6S as the ELP
obtained from 6 by deleting
(i) each rule that has a formula not L in its body with
L # S, and
(ii) all formulas of the form not L in the bodies of the
remaining rules.
We call S an answer set of 6 iff S=!(6S).
The review of default logic below [14] is restricted to the
case of quantifier-free defaults, which allow us to disregard
the process of Skolemization involved in defining extensions
in the general case [2].
Definition 13 [14]. A default in an expression of the
form
#  : : M;1 , ..., M;n , (4.2)
where :1 , ;1 , ..., ;n , # are quantifier-free formulas; if the
prerequisite of the default is empty, we write #  true:
M;1 , ..., M;n ; if its justifications are empty (n=0) we write
#  : :; if its prerequisite and justifications are both empty,
we write #  true. A default theory is a set of defaults of the
form (4.2).
Notice that (4.2) can be written as : : M;1 , ..., M;n # in
the notation of [2], and we identify an element # from W of
a default theory (D, W ) with the default #  true :.
The following theorem is shown in [14] and establishes
an 11 correspondence between answer sets of an ELP and
its extensions.
Theorem 4.4 [14]. For any ELP 6,
(i) if S is an answer set of 6, then the deductive closure
of S is an extension of 6;
(ii) every extension of 6 is the deductive closure of
exactly one answer set of 6.
Following [14], we identify a rule from an ELP 6
L0  L1 , ..., Lm , notLm+1 , ..., notLn
with the default
L0  L1 7 } } } 7 Lm : MLM+1, ..., MLn ,
where L stands for literal complementary to L : A =cA,
cA=A (A is an atom). Similarly, a default with variables
is treated as shorthand for the set of its ground instances.
Every ELP is identified in this way with some closed default
theory.
Let 6 be an ELP. We define
PRE(6)=[Li | 1im, L0  L1 , ...,
Lm notLm+1 , ..., notLn # 6 ]
CCS(6)=[Li | m+1in, L0  L1 , ...,
Lm notLm+1 , ..., notLn # 6 ]
CON(6)=[L0 | L0  L1 , ..., Lm , notLm+1 , ..., notLn # 6 ].
In particular, CON(6)=Lit when CON(6) contains a
pair of complementary literals.
Now we can easy derive new conditions for existence of
answer sets based on Theorems 2.9 and 2.10.
Theorem 4.5. Let 6 be an ELP. If CON(6) &
CCS(6)=<, then 6 has exactly one answer set.
Proof. There two cases to be considered.
Case 1. CCS(6)=<. Clearly, E=i0 Ei is a unique
answer set, where E0=[# | # # 6 ], Ei+1=[# | #  : #
66: # Ei ].
Case 2. CCS(6){<. Let 6$ be a maximal subset of 6
such that if m>0 then nm+1 in every rule (4.1) of 6$. By
Theorems 2.9 and 4.4 6$ has only one answer set E$ . Let
E=E$ _ [# | #  : # 6, : # E$]. Then it is obvious that E is
only one answer set of 6.
Similarly we have
Theorem 4.6. Let 6 be an ELP. If for any subset 6$ of
6 satisfying CON(6$) & CCS(6$)=<, at least one of the
following conditions holds for any rule L0  L1 , ..., Lm ,
notLm+1, ..., notLn # 6:
(i) there exists i (m+1in) such that Li # CON(6$)
(ii) CON(6") & CCS(6")=<,
where 6"=6$ _ [L0  L1 , ..., Lm , notLm+1 , ..., notLn],
then 6 has an answer set.
Following Lloyd [15], a general logic program (GLP)
can be defined as a set of rules of the form
A0  A1 , ..., Am , notAm+1 , ..., notAn ,
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where nm0 and each Ai is an atom. (Notice that the
sign c stands there for negation-as failure and thus
corresponds to not here.) Clearly, GLP are a special case of
ELPs. The concepts of stratified, signing, and call-consistent
DB are defined as those in [15].
The above theorems give conditions for the existence of
answer sets. These conditions are different from the other
known sufficient conditions, e.g., stratification [16] and
signing [17]. This also suggests their usefulness. To
illustrate this we consider a group of examples.
According to Proposition 2 of [14] an ELP 6 has a
consistent answer set S iff 6+ has an answer set S +, where
6+ stands for the GLP obtained from 6 by replacing each
rule (4.1) with
L+0  L
+
1 , ..., L
+
m , notL
+
m+1 , ..., notL
+
n .
(S+ stands for the set of positive forms of the elements of S
and L+ is the positive form of a literal L, i.e., for any
predicate P if L=P then L+=P; if L=cP then L+=P$,
where P$ is a new predicate of the same arity.) So it is suf-
ficient to consider only SLPs in order to suggest usefulness
of our results in the section.
Example 4.1. Let 6 be the ELP with the rule q(x) 
p(x, y), notq( y) replaced by its ground instances:
p(1, 2)
q(1)  p(1, 1), notq(1)
q(1)  p(1, 2), notq(2)
q(2)  p(2, 1), notq(1)
q(2)  p(2, 2), notq(2).
Clearly, [ p(1, 2), q(1)  p(1, 2), notq(2)] is a unique
subset of 6 satisfying conditions of Theorem 2.2 and 6 has
exactly one answer set [ p(1, 2), q(1)]. But 6 is neither
stratified nor signing so that none of iterated fixed point and
perfect model semantics can be applied to it.
Example 4.2. Let 6 be a GLP
p  notq
q  notp
r  s
r  nots
s  s.
Clearly, 6 is neither stratified nor signing, but it is call-con-
sistent. 6 satisfies conditions of Theorem 4.6 and therefore
has two answer sets: [ p, r] and [q, r].
Example 4.3. Let 6 be a GLP
p  q, nots
s  p, notp
q 
p 
Clearly, 6 is not call-consistent, but it satisfies conditions
of Theorem 4.6. 6 has exactly one answer set Th([ p, q]).
5. CONCLUSION
Exploring the existence of extensions of general default
theories have been an interesting topic of Reiter’s default
logic, since existence of extensions is not guaranteed.
Although Reiter gave a quasi-inductive characterization
(see Theorem 2.1 of [2]), it is necessary to test an enormous
collection of guessed sets (i.e., a collection of sets E in
Theorem 2.1 of [2]). This obstructs further study of the
general class of defaults. Entherngiton [21], [22] viewed
defaults as extending the first order knowledge about
incomplete specified world and selected restricted subsets
of the models of the underlying first order theory. Unfor-
tunately, his procedure for generating all the extensions may
never terminate ever though the theory has an extension.
Lukaszewicz [6] formalized Enterington’s idea for a restricted
class of default theories. Sandewall [7] thought that the
concept of fixpoint is central to the study of non-monotonic
logic, and he proposed a functional approach which is taken
in denotational semantics. He gave a sufficient condition for
the existence of a derivation that reaches or approaches the
fixpoint. Marek and Truszczynski (for short MT) [23]
developed a proof-theoretical approach based on the
concept of an S-derivation, which is also quasi-inductive.
Guerreiro and Casanova [24] provided a characterization
of extensions in terms of sets of valuations, which can be
obtained from Reiter’s quasi-inductive characterization by a
simple application of the completeness theorem. Bidoit and
Froidevaux [25] and MT [26] discovered close connec-
tions between the GelfondLifschitz approach to logic
programming [18] and default logic. We presented a
characterization of extensions and a procedure for comput-
ing an extension in [1], which well solved problems of
existence of extensions.
In this paper we have represented the characterization of
extensions and specified the algorithms based on the proce-
dure given in [1] into a slightly different way from our
original one [1, 19, 20], which motivates the subsequent
development. In particular, a class of default theories, the
class of auto-compatible default theories, is developed. We
also showed that the class of auto-compatible default
theories maintain the same nice features as the class of
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normal default theories. And we established that auto-
compatibility is equivalent to semi-monotonicity for the
class of prerequisite-free default theories. As applications, a
correspondence between maximally strong joint compatible
subset of defaults and a subset of maximally consistent
extensions of a valuation is established, and new conditions
for existence of answer set of ELP are obtained. We will
deeply study the importance of the class of auto-compatible
default theories in another paper.
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